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A B S T R A C T
This paper investigates the role of property rights in environmental decisions and choices regarding the dis-
tribution of income in a downstream water pollution problem. The results confirm that who owns the property
rights is a significant determinant of these decisions. More specifically, under certain conditions a property rights
owner who suffers the consequences of negative externalities acts, on average, more environmentally friendly
than a property rights owner who causes such negative externality. Similarly, when it comes to the distribution
of income, the property rights owners who cause negative externalities allocate on average a larger share of the
income to themselves.
1. Introduction
One of the concerns in environmental and ecological economics is
the overexploitation of natural resources, especially in conjunction with
negative externalities. One example of such negative externalities due
to resource extraction is the use of fracking in the gas extraction in-
dustry (Hawkins, 2015). Some key problems are the negative impact of
fracking on water quality, air quality, and seismic activity. Another
example, more pertinent to the context of the current study, is down-
stream water pollution due to high-intensity farming practices up-
stream. A study of the Pomahaka River in Australia by Harding et al.
(1999) shows that such high intensity farming indeed has significant
effects on downstream river health, in particular affecting species
composition. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2017) in the
US states that “The National Water Quality Assessment shows that
agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution is the leading source of water
quality impacts on surveyed rivers and streams, the third largest source for
lakes, the second largest source of impairments to wetlands, and a major
contributor to contamination of surveyed estuaries and ground water.”
Policy solutions to these problems focus on internalizing costs to
reduce externalities and, following the tenets of the Coase Theorem
(Coase, 1960), moving away from common to individual property - i.e.
privatize the natural resource ownership, or change to government
ownership (e.g. state parks, national parks, protected areas). However,
Ostrom and Cox (2010) criticize that these approaches are often seen as
a panacea to common resource and pollution problems - real world
situations are vastly more complex and require tailored policy re-
sponses instead of such generalized policies.
Consider the case of pollution in Tuttle Creek Lake in Kansas, which
is a reservoir on the Big Blue River. The Big Blue River flows through
areas in Nebraska and Kansas characterized by intense agricultural
production. It is unclear who owns the property right to water quality in
this context. Farm operators consider it their right to choose the agri-
cultural production process on their land, irrespective of the con-
sequences of those choices on water quality due to agricultural run-off.
Similarly, downstream water users consider it their right to enjoy clean
water for drinking or leisure activities, such as boating, fishing, or
swimming, irrespective of the constraints this imposes on the upstream
agricultural producers. One way to deal with such an issue is for the
government to step in and impose a set of rules and regulations.
However, farm operators in the U.S. have traditionally resisted such
government interference and generally command-and-control ap-
proaches are less efficient than more market-based approaches (e.g.,
Seskin et al., 1983; Spofford Jr., 1984; Krupnick, 1986). Due to the
number of stakeholders involved, the transaction costs of negotiations
would likely be significant and as such the Coase Theorem is unlikely to
offer an efficient approach either. Nonetheless, this raises the question
on what impact assigning clearly defined property rights has if nego-
tiation is not possible. In particular, we are interested in this paper to
determine if assigning property rights to one group of stakeholders (in
this context farm operators or downstream water user) will make a
significant difference in terms of environmental outcomes and income
distribution, compared to assigning it to the other group. Our results
support that assigning property rights to the polluter increases pollu-
tion, but only in specific situations, and favors the polluter in terms of
the income distribution.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
outline previous research and develop the testable hypotheses. In Section 3
we discuss the experimental design and procedures. In Section 4 we
analyze the results. In Section 5 we discuss the results and conclude.
2. Previous Research and Testable Hypotheses
When it comes to the experimental economics literature, the role of
property rights has been studied in three well-known games: dictator
games; (ultimatum) bargaining games; and trust games. Below we will
discuss each of these games.
In the context of the dictator game, Hoffman et al. (1994) find that
having earned property rights (rather than them being allocated) sig-
nificantly reduces giving. This is further supported by Cherry (2001) and
Cherry et al. (2002), who demonstrate that dictators display self-interested
behavior in the vast majority of cases if entitlements are earned, but much
less so if entitlements are allocated. Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) further
analyze the impact of the receiver earning wealth through costly effort.
Their results demonstrate that if the receiver earned the property right, the
dictator was sharing significantly more. In general, the share of the overall
available endowment going to the dictator and the frequency of self-in-
terested behavior is sensitive to the choice set available to the dictator. List
(2007) and Bardsley (2008) show that if an option to take away endow-
ment from the non-dictator is introduced, giving is significantly lower.
Cappelen et al. (2012) demonstrate that these results are independent of
whether the endowment is earned. Cox et al. (2016) formally explain this
as the choice set providing a moral reference point, which in turn affects
the decision of acting generously.
Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) conduct a bargaining experiment in
which two subjects bargain over the distribution of payoffs. Most pairs
of subjects maximize joint profits and close to 50 percent of them end
up splitting the payoff equally. In a follow-up experiment (Hoffman and
Spitzer, 1985), control of the initial endowment was earned through a
contest, rather than through random allocation. The resulting split of
the endowment is substantially more biased toward the controller of the
endowment (divider). Hoffman et al. (1994) corroborate in an ulti-
matum bargaining game (UBG) that the divider offers significant less to
the recipient if the entitlement is earned, rather than allocated. Guth
and Tietz (1986) further show that when the role in the UBG is auc-
tioned off, offers to the recipient are significantly lower. Gaechter and
Riedle (2005) highlight that it is not only the legal right to the property
that matters for bargaining outcomes, but also the moral right, earned
through superior performance on a trivia quiz. Subjects with more
moral rights to the pie receive a larger share.
In the standard trust game (Berg et al., 1995) subjects (trustors) are
provided with an endowment, part of which they can choose to “en-
trust” to another subject (trustee) for potentially increased (or de-
creased) return. Fahr and Irlenbush (2000) investigate the change in
behavior of trustors and trustees if the endowment is earned in a real
effort task. Their results demonstrate that trustors invest more if the
trustee had earned the property rights and that the trustee returns more
money if the trustor had earned the property rights. Cox et al. (2009)
implement a further variation to this game in that they label the basic
game design given by Berg et al. (1995) as the private or common
property game. In this private property game, the subject starts with
owning the endowment (i.e. property) and may contribute part of it to
achieve a social benefit. The common property game instead labels the
endowment as owned by society and the first mover can take any
amount away from this endowment for private gain (and social loss).
Cox et al. (2009) find that endowments that are introduced as common
property lead to slight, albeit statistically insignificant, increases in
cooperative and trusting behavior. Cox and Hall (2010) conduct the
same experiment, except that they increase the feeling of entitlement to
the endowment, by requiring subjects to complete a real effort task to
earn the endowment before the start of the experiment. This reverses
the ordering of outcomes in Cox et al. (2009) - under stronger feelings
of entitlement subjects are statistically significantly more cooperative
and trusting in a private property setting than a common property trust
game. Coleman (2016) derive a similar result using the design by Cox
et al. (2009) in Bulgaria - a post-communist country. While not exactly
a trust game in the sense of Berg et al. (1995), the paper by Cox et al.
(2017) bears enough similarities to be included in this section. It in-
troduces a sequential move game to measure reciprocity by a second
mover in response to acts of commission or omission by a first mover.
Their findings support that earning the endowment significantly af-
fected the behavior of the first mover, but did not affect second movers'
reciprocal response.
It is important to note that most of the authors mentioned above
define property rights as earned endowment, in contrast to an allocated
endowment. To the best of our knowledge, Cox et al. (2009), Cox and
Hall (2010), and Coleman (2016) are the first authors that explicitly
test the impact of different property rights regimes rather than earned
versus allocated endowment. In this paper, we further investigate this
issue. In contrast to their papers we do not have different property right
regimes but focus on the impact of who owns the private property right.
Further, where Cox et al. (2009), Cox and Hall (2010), and Coleman
(2016) analyzed a context free trust game, we instead consider a con-
textualized negative externalities game that is based on a dictator game.
In particular, we investigate the difference in behavior if property right
owners play different roles in society.
We argue that it is quite important to consider the roles of economic
agents, because in the real world people do not make choices in a context
free environment – their opinions, attitudes, and personality are mostly
formed by their environment and their roles therein and hence might have
a significant impact on the choices they are making. This goes back to the
argument by Ostrom and Cox (2010) – we need to consider the specific
context for effective policy design rather than try to develop (non-existing)
panaceas. This paper tests experimentally whether in an upstream-down-
stream water pollution problem without bargaining (i.e. cases in which the
Coase Theorem does not apply), the initial assignment of property rights
matters when it comes to the level of pollution chosen and the distribution
of income between property right owner and non-owner. This may pro-
vide further insights into where and how assigning property rights may
lead to desirable outcomes and thus helps address the concerns raised by
Ostrom and Cox (2010).
Ex-ante, it is unclear how far the role a person plays in society affects
their pro-environmental behavior. In particular, we are interested in the
impact of the property rights belonging to a polluter compared to them
belonging to the victim of pollution, controlling for the income effects
of the pollution decisions. Since environmental problems are more
salient to the latter, we hypothesize that these individuals will feel more
directly affected by environmental degradation and perhaps are better
able to empathize with nature and fellow human beings and will act on
that empathy by protecting the environment, even at a personal cost.
Hypothesis 1. Assigning property rights to the victim of pollution will
lead to lower levels of pollution than if the property rights are assigned
to the polluter.
Similarly, this paper investigates how far the role a person plays in
society affects the income distribution. It stands to reason that a person
that has the property rights to a resource will allocate the largest share of
the income coming out of that resource to self. Ex-ante it is unclear,
however, in how far the role being played affects the size of that share. We
conjecture that, similar to Hypothesis 1, those subjects that are typically
more exposed to negative consequences of the decisions of others, are
perhaps better able to empathize with fellow human beings and thus be
more inclined to share a larger portion of the income out of the resource.
Hypothesis 2. Assigning property rights to the victim of pollution will
lead to a more equal distribution of income than if the property rights
are assigned to the polluter.
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3. Experimental Design and Procedures
3.1. Experimental Design
To test the hypotheses, we used a framed laboratory experiment
modeling a downstream water pollution situation with two players: an
Upstream Farmer (UF) and a Downstream Water User (DWU). The UF is
an agricultural operator who has 500 acres of farming land upstream.
The DWU is an individual who gets drinking water and uses water for
recreational purposes from the river or the lake downstream. Both UF
and DWU can be the property rights owner (PRO). The PRO owns the
rights to the downstream water and thus can decide how much land out
of 500 acres will be placed under Conservation Tillage (CT), with the
corresponding pollution. CT is a relatively less harmful tilling practice
as compared to intensive tillage due to land being disturbed minimally.
CT leads to lower chemical runoff, less soil erosion and, as a result,
higher drinking water quality in the rivers and lakes downstream. At
the same time, CT is perceived1 as a costlier farming practice than in-
tensive tillage due to less certainty regarding planting dates and higher
risks. The payoff of the DWU is therefore affected by the choice of CT by
the PRO. The party who does not own property rights (this can be either
the UF or the DWU) is called the Non-owner of Property Rights (NPRO).
The game consists of three stages (Fig. 1). During Stage 1, the PRO
decides how much of farming land will be placed under CT. The rest of
the land is assumed to be under intensive tillage. Property right own-
ership is a treatment variable – in some treatments the UF is the PRO,
arguably perceived as the standard case of our social and economic
reality, in others the DWU is the PRO. Depending on the chosen CT, the
UF and DWU get different initial payoffs (Table 1). Note that the so-
cially optimal (yielding the highest total payoff for both players) level
of CT is 300, while the lowest level of water pollution will occur when
CT=500. This implies an inherent tradeoff between economic (the
individual and group profit) and environmental considerations.
During Stage 2 the property right owner may choose to transfer
some portion of the DWU's payoff to the UF as compensation for any
reduction in payoff to the UF due to CT above 0. This captures the
reality of farm operators receiving explicit and implicit subsidies from
the government for environmentally friendly choices. In addition, it
allows us to separate the environmental decision from the decision on
monetary payoff. The maximum amount that can be transferred de-
pends on the relative payoffs of the two players, but after the transfer
the payoff to the DWU cannot be below 300 tokens. The payoff can be
transferred only one way – from the DWU to the UF. After the transfer,
the final payoffs are calculated.
During Stage 3 the chosen level of CT, the transfer, and the final
payoffs are displayed to both players. In the “No feedback” conditions the
game ends here. The game thus resembles a standard dictator game
(Kahneman et al., 1986) in which one player makes all the choices and the
other player only sees the results of the decisions. In the “feedback” con-
ditions, Stage 3 allows NPRO to provide feedback on the decisions made
by the property right owner. This feedback can take on the form of a
financial fine (called “Imposing Fine”) or appealing to empathy (called
“Emotional Feedback”) through the sending of a frowney face☹ (Fig.2).
Providing feedback is costly for the NPRO. Imposing a fine costs 1
token for each 5 tokens of fine imposed. Sending a frowney face costs
50 tokens.2 The fine/frowney can be applied to the choice of level of CT
and/or the choice of transfer. The combination of 2 PRO assignments
and 3 feedback types produced 6 experimental conditions (Table 2).
3.2. Experimental Procedure
We used the software z-Tree (Fishbacher, 2007) to program and
administer the experiment at the Experimental and Behavioral Eco-
nomics Laboratory at the University of Nebraska – Lincoln. Anonymity
was assured by using a 5-digit random number to track subjects' deci-
sions and make payments. Before the start of the game, instructions (see
Appendix A) were read out loud to all participants, and any potential
questions were answered. To ensure that subjects fully understood the
game, participants had to pass a test before proceeding to the actual
game.
Subjects were recruited from the student and non-student popula-
tion of Lincoln, NE, using emails, flyers, word-of-mouth, and postings in
local stores. In total 432 subjects participated in the experiment. Close
to 75% of subjects had farmers in their family and about one third of
subjects grew up in a rural area. Many subjects were therefore quite
familiar with the context of the experiment. As discussed before, de-
pending on the treatment, either the UF or DWU was holding the
property right, i.e. was the property right owner (PRO). To establish a
feeling of entitlement in the participants, the roles were assigned at the
beginning of the experiment based on a quiz on property rights (see
Appendix B for screenshots of the quiz). This was an important step to
increase external validity, because property rights in the agricultural
area have often been controlled for generations, generating a real
feeling of entitlement to make choices irrespective of any consequences
to other parties involved. Participants who scored in the top 50% on the
quiz earned the right to be a PRO. Subsequently the UFs and DWUs
were randomly paired and played for two rounds with the same
(anonymous) partner. At the end of the experiment, subjects answered
survey questions on demographic characteristics and personality scales.
Decisions by the participants were incentive compatible with tokens
exchanged at the end of the experiment at a rate of 75 tokens= $1,
with average cash earnings of $45 with a range of $15 to $71 for a
60–90min session. The opportunity cost (average reported hourly
wage) was $9.73. Fifty-one percent of subjects were female. The subject
ages ranged from 19 to 85 years, with an average age of 29.
3.3. Experimental Hypotheses Revisited
Based on the experimental design we test Hypothesis 1 using the
choice of CT as the relevant parameter. From an environmental per-
spective, it is unambiguously clear that a choice of CT=500 is the
optimal choice – all land would be farmed using CT. Ex-ante, it is un-
clear whether being a DWU or a UF affects this choice. The key dif-
ference between the roles is that the DWU does experience the effect of
pollution and irrespective of what happens to the total payoff, the
pollution is there to stay. As such, the DWU may feel more directly
affected by environmental degradation and perhaps is better able to
empathize with nature and fellow human beings.
Hypothesis 1. (reformulated): DWU as PRO puts more acres under CT
than UF as PRO.
Hypothesis 2 states that the share of income that is allocated to self
is lower for individuals who are experiencing negative consequences. In
the framework of this experiment, the Nash equilibrium choice is to
maximize the amount given to oneself. There is no financial or strategic
incentive to give any more tokens to the other player. Nonetheless,
experimental evidence shows that dictators do not always choose this
payoff-maximizing outcome (see for example Forsythe et al., 1994). For
this study, it is of secondary importance whether the dictator gives non-
zero amounts to the receiver. Instead we are interested in the impact of
who owns the property rights, and as such the comparison of the be-
havior of dictators in different treatments. We conjecture that, as
mentioned for Hypothesis 1 (reformulated), playing the role of the
DWU as PRO, allows subjects to put themselves better in the shoes of
someone being affected by other people's choices, and suffering perhaps
1 The reality is that conservation tillage typically is overall increasing profits.
Nonetheless, the perception is often different from reality.
2 The cost of 50 tokens was chosen based on the experiment conducted by Czap et al.
(2013). In their paper this cost led to 56%–60% of subjects choosing to send a frowney,
which is desirable from a statistical standpoint – i.e. we would like to have a variety of
observed behavior. This number is also in line with the frequency with which subjects
chose to impose monetary rewards and punishment in Andreoni et al. (2003).
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negative consequences. This may allow for increased empathy and
hence additional sharing of payoffs. Our second hypothesis is thus:
Hypothesis 2. (reformulated): The share3 of total payoff that is
allocated to self is higher if the UF is PRO than if the DWU is PRO.
4. Experimental Results
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of property rights
in environmental decisions and choices regarding the distribution of
income. Because, depending on the treatment, subjects may receive
feedback on their actions in the first round, which may affect their
behavior in the second round, we limit our analysis to the first round.4
The descriptive statistics show that who owns the property right
matters for the choice of CT (Fig. 3). Across all treatments, the DWU
allocates on average more land (342 acres) to CT than the UF does
(317 acres) as PRO (p-value=0.0683 for the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
test). It is important to note that the DWU as well as the UF choose on
average an allocation of CT acres that is above the total payoff max-
imizing allocation of CT= 300 (p-value < 0.05 for the UF is PRO),
suggesting environmental considerations.
The overall picture is somewhat less clear when we consider each
treatment separately. The dots in Fig. 4 show the average choice of CT
by treatment and the line indicates the 90% confidence interval based
on a bootstrap procedure with 1000 resamples.
We can see from Fig. 4 that the behavior of DWU is relatively
consistent across treatments, whereas the choices of the UF vary a lot.
However, based on the 90% confidence intervals none of the differences
are statistically significantly different from each other.
The distribution of choices (Fig. 5) is expressed as a percentage of the
total number of UFs and DWUs respective, because of the unequal number
of observations for the different treatments. It shows that the choice of
CT=300 is by far the most common choice for UF and DWU as PRO.
As one would expect, UFs choose a larger number at the lower end
of CT than the DWUs and DWUs choose more on the upper tail of the
distribution. The distributions are significantly different from each
other (p-value< 0.0001 for Fisher's Exact Test).
We further calculate the share of total available payoff that is al-
located by PRO to themselves. We use the share instead of absolute
payoff, because the pie to be shared by PRO and NPRO depends on the
choice of CT. As such, the absolute payoff is not the appropriate (in-
dependent) statistic to look at when trying to determine the impact of
property right ownership on wealth distribution. As evident from Fig. 6,
the difference between the UF as PRO and the DWU as PRO is ap-
proximately ten percentage points, or, expressed differently, the UF
gives 20% more to self than the DWU. This difference is economically
and statistically significant (p-value < 0.0001 for the Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test).
We again break this down by treatment and calculate 90% con-
fidence intervals based on a bootstrap with 1000 resamples (Fig. 7).
The results show that there is a significant difference between the
UF as PRO and the DWU as PRO across treatments of similar type, i.e.
the UF as PRO without feedback gives significantly more to self than the
DWU as PRO without feedback, the UF as PRO in the emotional feed-
back treatment gives significantly more to self than the DWU as PRO in
the emotional feedback treatment, and, lastly, the UF as PRO in the
fining treatment gives significantly more to self than DWU as PRO in
the fining treatment.
The distribution of total payoffs (Fig. 8) is again expressed using the
proportion of DWUs and UFs, respectively, that choose a share of total
payoff in the various ranges. The distribution reveals that DWU as PRO
and UF as PRO are by far the most likely to choose a share of between
45% and 55% (most of them are at 50%). A few DWU as PRO are
willing to end up with< 45%, but more choose to allocate a much
larger share, up to 85% to self. For the UF as PRO the picture is quite
different. A fairly large percentage of UF as PRO,> 20%, choose to
maximize own profits and end up in the 85–95% range.
To control for additional variables and shed some more light on
what is driving these results we run several regressions. The first set of
regressions is on the choice of CT (Table 3). We account for the trun-
cated choice set by running a Tobit regression (truncated between 0 and
500). Model 1 includes the dummy for UF is PRO as our main variable
of interest and controls for the additional treatment effects of inducing
empathy via providing emotional feedback or imposing a fine.5 It is
possible that the potential of being punished either with a frowney or a
monetary fine will alter the behavior when choosing CT. To account for
this possibility, we run a regression (Model 2) without any feedback
treatments (i.e. only roughly 1/3 of the data set). Interestingly, the
result shows that without the threat of punishment who owns the
property rights has no statistically significant impact on the choice of
1. PRO chooses CT 
2. PRO chooses transfer from 
DWU to UF 
Determines pollution & welfare distribution 
3. NPRO sends emotional feedback 
or fine to PRO 
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Fig. 1. Stages of a round.
Table 1
Initial payoff distribution.
Level of CT out
of 500
UF's payoff,
tokens
DWU's payoff,
tokens
Total payoff (not
displayed to players)
0 1500 300 1800
100 1300 700 2000
200 1100 1100 2200
300 900 1500 2400
400 700 1600 2300
500 500 1700 2200
3 We use percentage here, because the total payoff that is potentially allocated to self
depends on the choice of CT and the role played.
4 The analysis of the reaction to feedback goes beyond what this paper sets out to do
and is therefore excluded from the discussion apart from the analysis of its influence on
pre-feedback decisions.
5 Note that all data are from the first round so no punishment has been imposed before
choices are made.
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CT.
Model 3 differs from Model 1 in that it interacts the feedback con-
ditions with the dummy for UF as PRO. The results show that the im-
pact of the ownership of property rights is situation dependent. In si-
tuations in which punishment is possible the UF as PRO chooses a level
of CT that is much lower than in situations without feedback. While it
was expected that the UF as PRO will allocate less acreage to CT than
the DWU as PRO, it is rather surprising that this is only the case for the
feedback treatments. If anything, one would expect the opposite. As a
last robustness check on our results we ran a regression (Model 4) that
included dummy variables for all treatments (DWU no feedback is the
baseline), which further supports the results from Model 2 and Model 3.
Given that the maximum choice of acreage to put under CT is 500, a
difference of between 50 and 67 acres under the feedback treatments is
not only statistically significant, but also economically quite sub-
stantial. Hypothesis 1 is therefore partially supported.
The second set of regressions (Table 4) is on the share of the payoff
going to the PRO. The choice set is, again, truncated and as such would
call for a Tobit regression. Instead, we opted for running a linear re-
gression with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors for two
reasons: (1) the Breusch-Pagan test indicates heteroscedasticity in the
data and there is no good way to adjust for this when running a Tobit
regression, and (2) the truncation of the choice of the share of payoff
going to the PRO depends on the role the subject is playing and the
choice of CT and as such there are no clear truncation parameters for
estimation. Ex-ante it is unclear how far the choice of CT matters for the
subsequent choice of the share of payoff going to the PRO. We therefore
run one “share of payoff going to PRO” regression with CT and one
without CT to check for robustness of the results. The regression with
CT also contains an interaction term of CT and the dummy for the UF
being a PRO. This interaction term is included, because a higher choice
of CT means different (opposite) things for the UF and DWU: for the UF
an increase in CT leads to a decrease in pre-transfer profits, whereas for
the DWU an increase in CT leads to an increase in pre-transfer profits. In
addition to “UF is PRO”, the principal variable of interest, we include
dummy variables for the feedback conditions (i.e. Imposing Fine or
Emotinal Feedback inducing empathy).
Similar to the regression on CT (Models 1–4), we also investigate
how far the results are robust to variations in the treatment of the
feedback/fine conditions. Model 7 removes all data from the feedback/
fine conditions, whereas Model 8 interacts the feedback/fine with the
dummy for UF as PRO. In addition, to be consistent with our analysis in
Model 4 (Table 3), we also run a regression (Model 9 in Table 5) with
dummies for all treatments and DWU as PRO without feedback/fine as
the baseline case.
The results consistently show that who owns the property right is
statistically and economically highly significant when it comes to the
distribution of income. Compared to the DWU as the property right
owner, the UF allocates almost 10 percentage points more to self, based
on the regression without CT. The regression with CT is a bit harder to
interpret, as it includes the interaction term. Since the UF on average
chooses a CT of about 340, the net impact of being a UF is consistent
with the results from the regression without CT for the average UF. The
317
342
300
315
330
345
UF is PRO DWU is PRO
Fig. 3. Conservation Tillage depending on who owns the property rights.
Fig. 2. The z-Tree screenshot: an example of appealing to empathy via emotional feedback sent by DWU to UF.
Table 2
Number of participants in each experimental condition.
Type of feedback
No feedback Imposing Fine Emotional Feedback
UF is PRO 40 80 80
DWU is PRO 40 96 96
H.J. Czap et al. Ecological Economics 150 (2018) 229–240
233
UFs that chose a lower CT end up giving a higher share of the overall
pie to themselves.6 Excluding the feedback conditions from our analysis
(Model 7) only further increases the share of payoff going to the PRO.
Interestingly, in Model 7 the interaction term between UF as PRO and
CT is positive, which implies, contrary to the other models, that a
higher choice of CT leads to an increase in the share of payoff going to
the PRO. Models 8–9 further corroborate the results from Model 6.
Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In light of the proposed significant budget cuts to many federal
agencies, in particular the Environmental Protection Agency,7 coupled
with significant environmental challenges, it is paramount for policy
makers to develop cheaper policy alternatives to achieve environmental
and social objectives. The current policy paradigm, which is focused on
market incentives or top-down regulation, comes with significant costs.
Alternative approaches derived from experimental and behavioral re-
search may replace or augment these more traditional approaches at
significantly lower costs. In this paper we simplify a complex real world
multi-person interaction with non-point source pollution as a negative
externality to an experimental situation with only two parties involved,
an upstream farmer who potentially causes pollution and a downstream
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6 Note: whether UF or DWU is the PRO, the PRO will get a larger share of income.
However, the UF as a PRO will get a larger share of the pie than the DWU would as a PRO.
7 As of the writing of this article (September 2017), the proposed budget cuts to the
EPA amounted to $2.6 billion, roughly 1/3 of its prior budget.
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water user who suffers the consequences of said pollution. In this
context, we ask the question: does it matter, who owns the property
rights (farm operator or water user) for environmental choices and
income distribution?
This paper adds to the agricultural and environmental literature on
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Table 3
Effect of property rights ownership on the choice of CT.
Variable Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
All data Subset All data All data
Intercept 384.14⁎⁎⁎ 371.89⁎⁎⁎ 350.98⁎⁎⁎ 365.14⁎⁎⁎
UF is PRO (Yes= 1) −29.7⁎⁎ – 22.01 –
UF is PRO & no Feedback
(Yes= 1)
– 6.7 – 7.82
UF is PRO & Emot Feedback
(Yes= 1)
– – – −59.24⁎⁎
UF is PRO & Imposing Fine
(Yes= 1)
– – – −50.85⁎
DWU is PRO & Emot Feedback
(Yes= 1)
– – – −6.95
DWU is PRO & Imposing Fine
(Yes= 1)
– – – −27
Control Variables:
Emotional Feedback (Yes= 1) −36.26⁎ – – –
Imposing Fine (Yes= 1) −43.29⁎⁎ – – –
Emotional Feedback×UF is
PRO
– – −67.08⁎⁎ –
Imposing Fine×UF is PRO – – −58.69⁎⁎ –
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎ Significant at 10%.
Table 4
The effect of property rights ownership on the share of payoff allocated to self.
Variable Name Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
All data All data Subset All data
Intercept 0.5379⁎⁎⁎ 0.3387⁎⁎⁎ 0.2464⁎⁎ 0.3259⁎⁎⁎
CT – 0.0006⁎⁎⁎ 0.0008⁎⁎⁎ 0.0006⁎⁎⁎
UF is PRO (Yes= 1) 0.099⁎⁎⁎ 0.4291⁎⁎⁎ 0.5902⁎⁎⁎ 0.4615⁎⁎⁎
CT×UF is PRO (Yes=1) – −0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.0014⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎
Control Variables:
Emotional Feedback
(Yes= 1)
0.0243⁎ 0.0138 – –
Imposing Fine (Yes=1) −0.0252 −0.0296 – –
Emotional Feedback×UF is
PRO
– – – −0.001
Imposing Fine×UF is PRO – – – −0.0514
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎ Significant at 10%.
H.J. Czap et al. Ecological Economics 150 (2018) 229–240
235
negative externalities and the experimental literature on the role of
property rights. Our results show that subjects care for the environ-
ment. Choices by the UF as PRO above CT=300 indicate environ-
mental concern. For the DWU as PRO such a choice could be due to the
desire to increase own payoff. However, of all the choices of CT by the
DWU as PRO that are above the payoff maximizing choice of CT=300,
75% show a subsequent substantial transfer (428 tokens) to the UF,
clearly not a profit maximizing behavior. As such, the initial choice to
pick a higher CT strongly indicates environmental considerations at
play. More importantly for this paper, we find that without bargaining
the impact of the initial assignment of property rights on environmental
as well as distributional outcomes depends on the presence of fines/
emotional feedback. In the treatments without fines/emotional feed-
back the allocation of property rights has no impact on the environ-
mental outcome. This is an interesting result as it is consistent with the
prediction of the Coase Theorem, but without negotiation! On the other
hand, if there is a threat of a fine/emotional feedback, giving the
property right to the polluter will lead to worse environmental out-
comes (lower CT). This result is somewhat surprising, because with a
potential fine/emotional feedback one would rather expect better en-
vironmental outcomes (higher CT) instead of worse outcomes. One
possible explanation is that potential punishment made subjects feel
more compelled to reach the maximum total payoff by choosing
CT=300 and as such they decided against a more environmentally
friendly outcome (choosing CT higher than 300 acres). Another possible
explanation is based on the revealed altruism theory (Cox et al., 2008),
which was further investigated in Cox et al. (2017). Cox et al. (2017)
show that acts of commission illicit more negative reciprocity than acts
of omission. If UFs as PRO had a target final payoff for themselves in
mind when making the choice of CT, a larger choice of CT would ceteris
paribus require a larger subsequent transfer. Based on Cox et al. (2017)
this would likely be seen quite unfavorably and increase the chance of
punishment. As such, subjects might have been inclined to avoid that
situation. One problem with this explanation is that there really is no
total payoff maximizing reason for choosing a CT > 300. Future re-
search is needed to investigate this phenomenon in more detail.
Having the DWU as PRO will result in a more egalitarian income
distribution. The DWU as PRO will on average still allocate more in-
come to self than to other, but to a lesser degree than if the UF is PRO.
This result holds in all conditions (with and without the threat of a fine/
emotional feedback). One explanation for why the threat of a fine/
emotional feedback makes no difference in the income distribution
choice (whereas it does for the pro-environmental choice) is based on
the sequence of play in the experiment. As discussed above, subjects
may take the potential for punishment into consideration when making
their choice for CT. Once the CT is chosen, there is no further impact of
the threat of punishment on the income distribution, because CT is
controlled for.
Our results thus confirm that “might makes right”, but to varying
degrees, depending on the role played. Singer and Fehr (2005) con-
jecture that the ability to empathize will potentially reduce self-inter-
ested choices. This is supported in Czap et al. (2013), who demonstrate
that being able to walk-in-the-shoes of others significantly increases
altruistic behavior. We speculate that playing the role of a DWU in an
upstream-downstream pollution game enables players to walk-in-the-
shoes of others and therefore, as argued by the metaeconomics and dual
interest theory (Lynne et al., 2016), temper their self-interest. This re-
sult is irrespective of the degree of empathy in the subjects, which was
found to be statistically insignificant. We can therefore speculate, that
being in the position of a person experiencing the (negative) con-
sequences of other people's behavior allows a person to be more em-
pathetic and walk-in-the-shoes of another person in this particular
context, but not necessarily be a more empathetic person.
The main implication for policy makers is that we cannot achieve
more pro-environmental choices by reassigning property rights without
also having a system of feedback or punishment in place for the up-
stream polluter. The good news is that all it takes is to enable affected
downstream water users to express their disapproval to achieve similar
results than with a system of monetary fines in place. We find that the
victim of pollution does not make pro-environmental choices solely to
benefit him/herself monetarily, but also for the sake of the environment
itself. Another policy implication is that, if a more egalitarian income
distribution is the desired outcome, policy makers can assign property
rights to those parts of society that usually are at the receiving end of
negative externalities. Rather than seek retribution, or behave sym-
metrically to what they might typically experience, these people may
actually feel more empathy to their fellow human beings and as such
achieve a more equal distribution of income without further costly
regulation.
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Appendix A. Instructions
Below is an example of the instructions handed out to subjects. There were 6 versions of instructions, one for each treatment. The main difference
was in who is the PRO and therefore makes the decision in Stage 1 and Stage 2, and whether there was a stage 4.
Summary of Instructions
Basics:
• Game will be played for 2 rounds with the same person
• Exchange rate $1=75 tokens
• Your cash earnings will be paid to you privately and will consist of two parts:
o the sum of the game payoffs in 2 rounds
Table 5
The effect of property rights ownership on the share of payoff allocated to self
with dummies for each treatment.
Variable Name Model 9
Intercept 0.323⁎⁎⁎
CT 0.0006⁎⁎⁎
CT× (UF is PRO & no Feedback) −0.0012⁎⁎⁎
CT× (UF is PRO & Emotional Feedback) −0.001⁎⁎⁎
CT× (UF is PRO & Imposing Fine) −0.001⁎⁎⁎
UF is PRO & no Feedback (Yes= 1) 0.5136⁎⁎⁎
UF is PRO & Emotional Feedback (Yes= 1) 0.45⁎⁎⁎
UF is PRO & Imposing Fine (Yes=1) 0.4076⁎⁎⁎
DWU is PRO & Emotional Feedback (Yes= 1) 0.0274
DWU is PRO & Imposing Fine (Yes=1) −0.0097
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
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o $15 base pay
• Your decisions are confidential and anonymous
• Communication with another participant during the experiment is not allowed
Each of the two rounds will go through the following stages.
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer's decision on Conservation Tillage
Upstream Farmer decides how much of the farming land (out of 500 acres) will be placed under Conservation Tillage (CT), which results in the
following payoffs:
Level of CT, acres of land Payoff of UF, tokens Payoff of DWU, tokens
0 1500 300
100 1300 700
200 1100 1100
300 900 1500
400 700 1600
500 500 1700
Stage 2: Transfer of payoffs by the Upstream Farmer
Upstream Farmer may choose to transfer some portion of payoff from Downstream Water User to self. The payoff of Downstream Water User after
the transfer cannot be below 300 tokens. The payoffs can be transferred only ONE way – from DWU to UF.
Stage 3: Downstream Water User's response:
Downstream Water User will be given information about:
(1) Level of Conservation Tillage determined by Upstream Farmer
(2) The transfer from DWU to UF and the resulting payoffs of UF and DWU
Downstream Water User can express 0, 1, 2 frowneys☹ to Upstream Farmer for: their choice of level of CT, for the transfer and resulting payoffs,
or for both. Expressing each☹ costs 50 tokens.
Stage 4: Application of feedback:
If 1 or 2 frowneys☹ have been expressed, Upstream Farmer will be shown☹ or☹☹ respectively.
Appendix B. Quiz to Determine the PRO
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